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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

FACTUAL EVENTS
Respondent, hereinafter "Buku", entered into two separate contracts l

2

with elderly

couples 3 , hereinafter "Clark" and "Peterson". The contracts entered into by Buku \vith the
appellants were nearly identical and both contracts depended on the complete sale of the
real property of both Clark and Peterson to Buku. The contracts \vere intertwined to allow
for the complete purchase of the adjoining property of both Clark and Peterson4• The Clark
property consisted of 80.17 acres and a home; and, the Peterson property consisted of
approximately 73 acres and a home. The elderly couples were using the sale of the real
property for their retirement years. Each property was to be purchased for the following
sum: Clark-$1,044,075.18; Peterson-$980,000.00.5
The two contracts were almost identical in nature. The major difference was the
earnest money payment. The Clarks received $25,000.00 of earnest money; the Petersons
received $327,000.00 of earnest money. The difference was the need, which was expressed
to respondent (Buku), of the Petersons' desire to purchase a retirement townhouse in Idaho
Falls, Idaho. The Peterson townhouse was purchased with the earnest money and was a
known fact to all parties to the action. The Petersons relied upon the representations of
plaintiff in accepting the down payment.

The Clark contract is contained at pages 89-94 of the record.
2 The Peterson contract is contained at pages 95-100 of the record.
3 Janet C. Clark is now deceased; Betty Jean Peterson has cancer which may be terminaL
4 See paragraph 25 of each contract. (R. pp 93, 99).
5 R. pp. 89, 100.
I
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The Clarks received a modest down payment to sell their real property to the
defendant and moved to Texas to begin their retirement plans. Neither set of defendants
believed any contingencies existed and that the contract was to be completed by a date
certain for them to begin retirement activities.
The parties entered into preliminary negotiations and, ultimately, signed the
contracts prepared by the respondent on August 30,2007. 6 The closing date \vas established
at December 21, 2007. The reason for the delay in closing was to allow the respondent to do
its "due diligence". Both contracts contained paragraph 3 of the "due diligence" language. 7
Due diligence or the conditions thereof are not explained in said paragraph.
The

real

estate

Defendants/ appellants

purchase
relied

agreements

upon

multiple

state

the

promises

terms
of

and

payment

conditions.
by

the

respondent/plaintiffs to the appellants/defendants-even subsequent to the closing date of
the transactions. The appellants did not participate with Buku's bank process nor were the
appellants involved in any actions of respondent concerning financing.
No conditions were placed upon the sale of the real property as it related in any way,
shape or form as to the County of Jefferson and any zoning or building requirements. The

R. pp. 93, 100.
7 Paragraph 3 of both contracts contains the following language: 3. Buyer's Obligations.
Buyer is obligated to pay the earnest money as set forth in this agreement and pay the
remaining purchase price at the timOe of closing. Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to
make sure that they are fully satisfied with the condition of the property, also any
requirements, environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs
to make for its due diligence purposes. Buyer \vill have four months to perform the due
diligence inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and concerns regarding the purchase.
Thus, closing will be on or before December 21, 2007.
6
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intent of usage by plaintiff for the subject real properties was irrelevant to the appellants.
No mutual agreement or understanding was made by the appellants as to the ultimate
usage of the real property being purchased by the respondent.

In fact, the only

understanding \vas that the down payment to Petersons was critical to their purchase of a
retirement home in Idaho Falls. Respondent \vas well aware of the zoned property as it met
\vith Jefferson County prior to the closing date on December 10, 2007. 8

Both set of

appellants continued to be ready, able and willing to perform on the sale and were ready,
willing and able to close at the closing date and subsequent to the closing date.
BUh."ll failed to close on December 21, 2007.

The legal disputes revolve around

paragraph 3 of the 1\vo contracts with the appellants; and, the use of the earnest money by
Peterson. Buku alleged that there were zoning issues on the real properties. Appellants
contend no such issues existed as the zoning never changed during the entire process. 9 The
contracts are silent on such language.

2.

LEGAL EVENTS
Ten months after the expiration of the closing date for the sale of the 1\vo real

properties, Buku signed it complaint for return of earnest money on October 15, 2008 and
filed the same with the Jefferson County court system. 1O The complaint alleged refund of
earnest money; conversion; unjust enrichment; a pre-judgment interest request; along with a

8

R. pp. 148. Affidavit of Foster: Pre-application meeting shows December 10,2007 and

lots are zoned I-acre,
R. pp. 144-146.
to R. p.12.

9
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request for fees and costs. ll Appellants filed an answer and counter-claim on December 10,
2008. 12 The counter-claim contained requests for specific performance of the contract;
breach of contract; unjust enrichment; estoppel; promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance;
consumer protection violations, along with a request for fees and costs.
Approximately one year after the complaint was filed, respondent, Buku, filed a
request for summary judgment. 13 Clark and Peterson filed a denial of the request for
summary judgment and objection to respondent's request along with the appellants' motion
for summary judgment. 14

Additionally, a motion to strike portions of the respondent's

affidavits was filed by appellants. 15
District Judge Gregory Moeller was the sitting judge at the time and made a ruling
denying summary judgment to respondents; and, did not consider the motion for summary
judgment of appellants. 16 He did opine, however, that the contracts \vith Clark and Peterson

·
17
were unam b IgUOUS.
DistrictJudge Dane Watkins was appointed
case from Jefferson County.
summary judgment. IS

the bench and was presented this first

The respondents, thereafter, filed a second motion for

Appellants contested the motion with memorandum and various

R. pp. 12-22.
R. pp. 33-45.
R. pp. 64-65.
14 R. pp. 114-118.
15
R. pp. 119-121.
16 R. pp. 197-210.
17 R. pp. 203-205.
18 R. pp. 290-292.
II

12
13
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4

affidavits. 19 Judge \Vatkins granted summary judgment

20

to the respondent, Buku, on all

issues and denied any of the counter-claim responses of the appellants, Clark and Peterson.
Appellants timely appealed to this court. 21 This court suspended the document entitled
"judgment" and remanded to the district court for a "final judgment in proper form".22 The
respondent then filed a motion for fees, costs and pre-judgment interest. The request for
fees, costs and interest would have been untimely but for the remand. Appellant objected. 23
The district judge then awarded fees, costs and pre- judgment interest to the
summary judgment decision award in favor of Buku. 24

The appellants then filed an

amended appeal to this court. 25
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

The Appellants request their costs and fees for the lo\ver court proceedings.

2.

The Appellants request their costs and fees on appeal.
ARGUMENT

1.

SUMMARY
Two mlings on summary judgment were submitted to the district court. Judge

Gregory Moeller heard the first motion for summary judgment and denied the request.
Judge Dane Watkins heard the second motion for summary judgment and granted the

R. pp. 310-347.
20 R. pp. 395-40S.
2l
R. pp. 409-412.
-- R. pp.434.
23 R. pp 435-440.
24
R. pp. 473-476.
25 R. pp. 50S-50S.
19

~~

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

5

request for the plaintiff/respondent.
The two major arguments of the appellants are straight-fonvard and clear in nature
and described hereafter.
Both judges indicated the contracts in question were unambiguous. If so, then parol
or evidence outside of the four corners of the contracts could not be considered.

Both

judges accepted information outside of the four corners of the contracts to render a
decision. Thus, the contracts could not have been unambiguous.
Judge Watkins accepted affidavit testimony of the respondents and did not accept
affidavit testimony of the appellants. Summary judgment could not have been granted and
the factual disputes would have to be determined by the fact-finder, to-wit: the jury.
Appellants allege that the respondent breached the contracts; and, that summary
judgment should have been granted in their favor.

\Vorst case scenario, the appellants

believe they should have had the opportunity to present their facts to the jury.
Judge Watkins then granted a monetary judgment; added prejudgment interest along
with costs and fees.
The two major issues surround the "unambiguous" contract; and, the earnest money
used by Peterson for their retirement to\-vnhome.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." 1.R.c.P. 56(c) (2002). In a motion for
summary judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of
the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835,
838-39,41 P.3d 263, 266-67 (2002). Summary judgment must be denied if
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reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting
inferences from the evidence presented.

Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 65 P.3d 509, 138
Idaho 487, (Idaho 2003)
------------ Excerpt from page 65 P.3d 513.
2.

INTRODUCTION.
The first major issue surrounding this case is the interpretation and application of a

due "diligence clause" contained in both of the contracts before this court. That language
is as follows:

3. Buyer's Obligations. Buyer is obligated to pay the earnest money as set
forth in this agreement and pay the remaining purchase price at the time of
closing. Prior to closing, it is Buyer'S obligation to make sure that they are
fully satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements,
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs
to make for its due diligence purposes. Buyer will have four months to
perform the due diligence inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and
concerns regarding the purchase. Thus, closing will be on or before
December 21, 2007.
This non-artfully drafted language is so vague that it would be impossible for any
court to know what "buyer needs for its due diligence." Paragraph 24 of the contracts is very
clear that the buyer drafted this agreement. 26 As the court is well a\vare, the court must
construe the language against the drafter.
(See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 201 (agreement interpreted in
accordance with the meaning assigned by the more "innocent" of the
parties); Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984)
(where trier of fact is unable to determine the intent of the parties, preference
is given to the meaning which operates against the party drafting the
agreement); RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 207 (preferring an interpretation

-?6 R. pp. 93, 99.
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favoring the public interest).

USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank7 815 P.2d 469, 120 Idaho 271, (Idaho
App.1991)
------------ Excerpt from page 815 P.2d 474.
The second major issue before this court concerns the earnest money agreement and
the Petersons' purchase of the retirement townhome from the earnest money. No question
exists that this purchase of townhome was a major factor in the sale contracts. It is evident
this event was major and can determined from the earnest money to Clarks of $25,000.00
and the comparing earnest money to Petersons of $327,000.00.
3.

THE RESPONDENT BREACHED THE CONTRACTS WITH APPELLANTS

AND THE INTENT OF SUCH CONTRACTS. THE LOWER COURT COULD NOT
SUPPLEMENT UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS.
Case law in Idaho is well defined on the interpretation of contracts and is illustrated
with the following:
The primary objective in constming a contract is to discover the intent
of the parties, and in order to effectuate this objective, the contract must be
vie\ved as a whole and considered in its entirety. The primary consideration
in interpreting an ambiguous contract is to determine the intent of the parties.
The determination of a contract's meaning and legal effect are questions of
law to be decided by the court where the contract is clear and unambiguous.
However, where a contract is determined to be ambiguous, the interpretation
of the document presents a question of fact \vhich focuses upon the intent of
the parties. The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous or not is a
question of law over which we may exercise free review, and in determining
whether a contract is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain \vhether the contract
is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation.

Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996-97, 829 P.2d 1342,1345-46 (1992).
A. The first summary judgment motion mled upon by Judge Gregory Moeller.
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The first motion for summary judgment bet\veen the parties resulted in a decision
from Judge Gregory Moeller denying summary judgment to either party. He opined that
the contracts in question were not ambiguous. Thus, the court could not accept any
information outside of the four corners of the contract to interpret the meaning of the
contracts.

The court did not do that as can be determined by his references to the

information contained in affidavits of both parties. 27 If the contracts are unambiguous,
outside information and/or parol evidence is irrelevant. Furthermore, the district court, in
this first decision, focused on the earnest money provision and not the due diligence clause
\vhich are the t\vo major issues before this court.
Under Idaho's parol evidence mle, where preliminary negotiations are
consummated by written agreement, the writing supercedes all previous
understandings and the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the
writing. Nuquist v. Bauscher, 71 Idaho 89, 94, 227 P.2d 83, 86 (1951). This
rule, however, applies only when the integrated character of the writing is
established. Whether a particular subject of negotiation is embodied in the
writing depends on the intent of the parties, revealed by their conduct and
language, and by the surrounding circumstances. Nysingh v. lVarren, 94
Idaho 384, 385, 488 P.2d 355, 356 (1971). The mere existence of a document
does not establish integration. Id. A "merger" clause in a written agreement
is one means of proving the integrated character of a writing. Tapper
Chevrolet Co. v. Hansen, 95 Idaho 436, 510 P.2d 1091 (1973).
Katseanes v. Yamagata, 653 P.2d 1185,103 Idaho 773, (Idaho App. 1982)
------------ Excerpt from page 653 P.2d 1187.
The trial court's finding that the contract was ambiguous is a question
of law. ll7.,ltson Construction Co. v. Reppel Steel & Slpply, 123 Ariz. 138, 598
P.2d 116 (Ariz.App.1979). When presented with an issue that raises only a
question of law, this Court is not bound by the findings of the trial court, but
is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented. Sharp v.

27

E.g. See footnotes 1-7 of the court's decision. R. pp.198-199, 203, 206.
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Hoerner !f7.'lldorfCorp., 584 P.2d 1298 (Mont.1978). See Harding v. Home
Investment & Savings Co., 49 Idaho 64,286 P. 920 (1930).
The respondent cites Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130,
540 P.2d 792 (1975), for the proposition that the trial court's finding of
ambiguity must be respected on appeal. However, as shown by the analysis
in Werry, the question of an ambiguity in a contract is separate from the
question concerning the interpretation of an ambiguous contract. In Werry,
we only held that, "where the terms of a contract are ambiguous its
interpretation and meaning is a fact question to be determined by the jury."
Id. at 135, 540 P.2d at 797, citing National Produce Distributors v.lIBles &
Jl;[eyer, 75 Idaho 460, 274 P.2d 831 (1954).

Clark v. St. Palll Property and Liability Ins.
(I daho 1981)
------------ Excerpt from page 639 P.2d 455.

Companies~

639 P.2d 454, 102 Idaho 756,

"Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of la\V over which we
exercise free review." Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 142, 106 P .3d 465, 468
(2005). Ambiguities can be either patent or latent. "Idaho courts look solely
to the face of a written agreement to determine whether it is [patently]
ambiguous." Ward v. Puregro Co., 128 Idaho 366, 369, 913 P.2d 582, 585
(1996). Accord, Vc-zlley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 808 P.2d 415 (1991).
"A latent ambiguity is not evident on the face of the instmment alone, but
becomes apparent when applying the instmment to the facts as they exist."
In re Estate ofKirk, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 794,801 (1995).

Swanson v. Beco Canst. CO'7 Inc., 175 P.3d 748, 145 Idaho 59, (Idaho 2007)
------------ Excerpt from page 175 P.3d 751.
Thus, the court determines if language in a contract is ambiguous. If a contract or
clause is not ambiguous, the court must stay \vithin the four corners of the contract and may
not consider evidence not contained in such contract. If the contract is ambiguous, the factfinder determines the facts to consider the ambiguous language and application thereof.
\vhen the terms of a contract are unambiguous, interpretation of the
contract and its legal effect are questions of la\v. Opportunity7 L.L.c. v.
Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605,38 P.3d 1258,1261 (2002) (citing Idaho v.
Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000». An unambiguous
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contract will be given its plain meaning, \vhich is based on the words of the
contract. Id. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the
mutual intent of the contracting [138 Idaho 492] parties at the time the
contract was entered. Id. at 607, 38 P.3d at 1263. If a contract is determined
ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. Elec. Wholesale Supply
Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 823,41 P.3d 242,251 (citing State v.
Bamett, 133 Idaho 231, 234, 985 P.2d 111, 114 (1999».

Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 65 P.3d 509, 138
Idaho 487, (Idaho 2003)
------------ Excerpt from pages 65 P.3d 513-65 P.3d 514.
The due diligence clause [paragraph 3 of the contracts] is overly broad by both the
appellants' opinion and the first court decision. 28 The contract, paragraph 3 clause: "they
[Buku] are fully satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements,
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs to make for
its due diligence purposes" is unquestionably overly broad. Also, it is capable of various
meanings and "all requirements" could include almost anything in the realm of possibility.
No questions exist that the condition of the property was not an issue. No questions
exist as to environmental concerns as being a non-issue. Thus, the first portion of the due
diligence language is not before the court.
What do "all of the requirements of the Buyer" mean? Nothing in the contract
discusses land uses, zoning, financing, water rights, title issues, disasters, eminent domain
or many of the "normal" concerns when purchasing real property. The contract appears to
have an overly broad catch-all contained in "all of the requirements" phrase.
The respondents have made no claim, whatsoever, that any problem existed with the

28

See, Judge Moeller's statement in the decision at R. p. 205, first paragraph.
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real property of both Clark and Peterson. The ONLY claim asserted by Buku is that the
property could potentially be re-zoned. Rhetorically asked: How could the district court
even come up with this kno\vledge unless outside information was considered?

If the

contracts are unambiguous, the court had to rely purely on the contracts and not consider
any outside information by way of affidavit or otherwise. It would be impossible to know of
Buku's claim of zoning issues by viewing the information within the four corners of the
contracts.

Further, the purpose of Bulm's purchase is never disclosed in the contracts.

How could the court even know if zoning was a concern on the use of the property by
respondents if zoning \vas never mentioned or contained in the "unambiguous" contracts?
Thus, the reasoning on the first decision of Judge Moeller had to be in error. The
result denying summary judgment was acceptable to the appellants. The reasoning on the
first decision, however, may have affected the result on the second ruling by Judge Watkins.
That court needed additional information to interpret Paragraph 3; and, it would need to be
supplemented to determine its meaning and application. Therefore, a portion of paragraph
3 of the contracts had to be ambiguous.
Like\vise the agreement with Peterson on the earnest money of $327,000.000, for the
purchase of the townhome for retirement, would require supplementation from affidavit,
parol evidence or other supplemental evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Thus,
Judge Moeller was correct that summary judgment could not be granted.

Summary

judgment could not be granted. The appellants agree with the result of Judge Moeller; but
disagree with the reasoning to reach the result. Therefore, the district court's reasoning to
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determine summary judgment \vas not appropriate but the denial of summary judgment
\vas in accord \vith appellants' belief. The reasoning to reach the end result is disputed by
appellants.
Every party to this transaction knew the property was zoned R-1 (residential-one
acre) at the time the contracts \vere contemplated, signed and completed. Every party to
this transaction knew the property was also zoned R-1 at the scheduled closing date. Also,
Buku was reassured that the subjects properties would be grandfathered and continued to
be zoned R_l/ 9 at all times before the contract, during the contract to closing; and, after the
transaction was completed.
The contracts are silent on the use of the property that was to be purchased by the
respondents.

Although, the appellants kne\v that the respondent were real estate

speculators and developers, nothing was contained in the contracts about the proposed
usage by respondents. Once again, the court would need to go outside of the contracts to
determine such additional facts.
Since the two contracts did not close on December 21, 2007, appellants believe that
the contracts were breached by the respondents. No reasonable explanation can be given
for not closing the transactions.

The potential for re-zone was not contained in the

contracts and, more important, was a non-issue because the property was not re-zoned or
contemplated to be re-zoned. This non-issue is a red herring developed by the respondent.
If, in fact, the respondents were known developers, Buku had extensive knowledge

See affidavit of Foster with attachments. R. pp. 144-153. See also Affidavit of Peterson.
R. pp. 139-140, par. 11, 14,21.

29
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that the land \vould be "grandfathered" by their applications to Jefferson County, Idaho for
development.

Buku had actual knowledge that the property would remain R-1 by its

December 10, 2007 meeting \vith the Jefferson County official, Naysha Foster. 30

The

respondents \vere re-assured of this position although Buku already possessed such
knowledge.

31

No legitimate explanation can be given for the breach by Buku.

The court, in this first ruling, never addressed the summary judgment motion filed
by appellants. 32

The court in its decision states:

"This decision addresses Buku's

motion.,,33 Thus, the court never considered the appellants' motion for summary judgment
although it \vas presented, briefed and argued to the court. The breach by Buku should
have entitled Clark and Peterson to summary judgment. Appellants gained no guidance on
their motion or the potential factual issues to be presented to a jury.
This first decision included the court's opinion that more facts need to be
ascertained on the conduct of the parties subsequent to the closing date. Admittedly, no
\vritten contracts or written amendments \vere entered into by the parties after the failed
closing date. HO\vever, verbal assurance were given on multiple occasions that the contract
would be fulfilled and that the Petersons did not need to worry about their earnest money
used to purchase the townhome ..3-f
Moreover, the parties had relied on the original contracts and both had begun partial
'0

R. p.148.
R. p. 148. the pre-application meeting with Jefferson County occurred on December 10,
r:P07 and Buku KNE\V (Emphasis Supplied) that the property was grandfathered at R-l.
R. pp. 116-117.
33 R. p. 199.
'4
Peterson affidavit, R. pp. 137-143.
J

3l

J

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

performance based upon such contracts. Subsequent to the failed closing, the respondent
continued to exercise dominion and control over the Peterson property.35

B. The second summary judgment motion filled upon by Judge Watkins.
The second filling on summary judgment \vas conducted by Judge Watkins. The
lower court also filled the contracts were unambiguous. The same reasoning applies as
above. How could the judge know of zoning if it \vas not contained in the four comers of
the contracts? How could the judge know of the intended use if it \vas not contained in the
four comers of the contracts? The court could not. Paragraph 3 had to be interpreted \vith
parol evidence from the affidavits by the lower court. This procedure would violate existing
case law as set forth above. Clark v. St. Paul Property and Liability Ins. Companies, 639 P.2d
454, 102 Idaho 756, (Idaho 1981);

S~vanson

v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 175 P.3d 748, 145 Idaho

59, (Idaho 2007).
The district court did not consider the affidavits of the appellants on the earnest
money arrangement.

If so, the court would have determined that a factual dispute existed

as to the use of the $327,000.00 for the Peterson purchase of the townhouse in Idaho Falls,
Idaho.

Summary judgment could not have been granted.

A fact-finder would need to

determine the surrounding conduct and intent of the parties. In the first decision, Judge
Moeller recognized this reality. The second filling by Judge Watkins ignored this fact.
The lower court supplemented the contracts with evidence from the affidavits on the

35

R. pp. 137-143; 329-347; (both Peterson affidavits from 1st and 2 nd decisions].
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zoning issue but failed to supplement the contracts \vith evidence from the affidavits on the
issue of the earnest money.

The lower court should have been obligated to consider

evidence both ways-not just to the advantage of the respondents.
Examples of the lower court accepting additional testimony on the zoning and use
issues include, but are not limited, as follows:
... both the Clark Property and the Peterson Property (hereinafter collectively
Properties) were zoned Residential-l ("R-l"), which would allow a minimum
density of one acre lots. (R. p. 396).
During the four month diligence period, Buku learned of a proposed
zoning change, which might have affected the Properties. (R. p. 396).
Between August 30, 2007 and December 18, 2007, issues arose regarding
the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission's plans to possibly
change the zoning categorization of the Properties to R-S. The change which
would allow a minimum density of five acre lots could have potentially
decreased the value of the Properties. (R. p. 396).
See also, first two paragraphs, R. p. 397.
In its decision, the court improperly states: "Neither party asserts the Agreements
are ambiguous.,,36 This statement is incorrect. Judge Moeller stated the agreements were
unambiguous.
Appellants stated that a portion of paragraph 3 of the agreements was not
ambiguous, to-wit: 1. condition of the property, and 2. environmental concerns. However,
the phrase "and all of the requirement that the Buyer needs ..." certainly is overly broad,
ambiguous and capable of multiple meanings.
The court also accepted the "red herring" when it stated: "Thus, the Agreements
36

R.p.401.
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permitted Buku to look into potential (emphasis supplied) zone changes that \vould affect
its 'interests and concerns'
no effect on Buku.

".37

If there were no possibility of zone changes, there could be

Buku knew that the real property was grandfathered.

Once again,

ho\vever, ho\v could the court even know that a zone change was an issue without accepting
evidence outside of the four-corners of the contracts. 38 If the lower court were to accept
outside evidence, shouldn't it also have accepted outside evidence on the issue of the
earnest money provided to Peterson for the townhome?
parties on an equal basis.

The court needs to treat both

The court's reasoning is inconsistent with an unambiguous

contract.
In footnote 4, R. p. 403, the 100ver court commits major error by stating: "'while the
court acknowledges the above facts, the record reflects that the 'grandfathering' issue was
not addressed by Jefferson County until March 2008, three months after the December 21,
2007 closing date."

That statement is totally untrue.

The pre-application subdivision

meeting with Buku occurred on December 10, 2007 and specifically stated: "Lot Size: 1 acre
building lots." See, R. p. 148 [half way dO\vn the page the date and lot size are listed].
(Emphasis Supplied). Buku absolutely knew beyond any doubt that the real property in
question was 1 acre lots (R-1). This knowledge was eleven (11) days before the scheduled
closing and \vithin the four month time period for due diligence.
In footnote 6, R. p. 405, the lower court commits additional error \vhen it dra\vs an
inference in favor of respondent that was a jury mission by stating:

R. p. 40 3.
38 See footnote 4, R. p. 403.
37
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"Based upon the

affidavits and exhibits attached with Buku's submissions, the Court questions whether the
"dominion and control" arguments asserted by the Clarks and Petersons would be
established."

The court continually accepts supplemental evidence to support the

"unambiguous" contracts and ignores any presentations of evidence by the appellants on
the issue of paragraph 3 or on the issue of the earnest money usage.

The appellants

requested a jury tria1. 39 The jury is the fact-finder not the court.
Judge Moeller noted that "Buku may not be entitled to recover under the
unambiguous contracts".40 Judge \Vatkins referred to such language and then went on to
form an opinion that the subsequent dealings had to be in writing.

Once again, if the

contracts were unambiguous, how "vould the evidence presented by affidavit affect the
validity of the "unambiguous contracts".

41

The subsequent dealings reiterate that the contract was still valid and that appellant
was going to honor its terms. 42 Respondent continually reiterated that the contract would be
fulfilled after the closing date. The jury needs to interpret these dealings and determine
whether the original contracts had been re-ratified. In any event, summary judgment in
favor of Buku was incorrect.

4.

THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE COUNTER-CLAIMS

OF THE APPELLANTS.

39

R. p. 44.
40 First Memorandum Decision, R. pp. 205-206; Judge \Vatkins recognized such fact. R. p.
404.
41
R. pp. 404-40;,.
st
nd
42 R. pp. 137-143; 329-347; [both Peterson affidavits from 1 and 2
decisions]
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Appellants various counter-claims were summarily dismissed by the Im-ver court in
the second decision by Judge Watkins. 43 The lower court cited Bates v. Seldon, 146 Idaho
772, 203 P.3d 702 (2009); Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138
Idaho 487, 65 P.3d 509 (2003) incorrectly.
First, if summary judgment is non-applicable because of the errors advance above,
the counter-claims remain. Second, and just as important, in Bates and Iron Eagle, the
lower court indicated that equity claims were not applicable because an adequate remedy at
law existed.
In the instant case, if the contract were held to be void or illusory, the appellants
have no remedy at law for the use of their property by Buku, for the declarations made
concerning the earnest money, for the dominion and control exercised by Buku over the
property of appellants and for the damages and lost revenue caused by Buku.
The counter-claims of appellants included specific performance, breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, estoppel and detrimental reliance.

[Consumer Protection Violations

were properly dismissed by Judge Moeller in the first decision.]+t
The equitable doctrines of unjust enrichment, estoppel and detrimental reliance
apply if no contract is in force. In quoting Bates at

77~

the lower court clearly should have

recognized that "The existence of an express agreement does not prevent the application of
the doctrine of unjust enrichment." If this court adheres to the lower court's decision that
the express contract between the parties is not enforceable (which the court found), then the
-+3

44

R. pp. 406-407.
R. pp. 207-208.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

19

equitable remedies apply.
Likewise, the lower court cited Iron Eagle at 492, for the same proposition. What the
Imver court failed to recognize is that those cases had remedies at law. If the court, in the
instant case, determines that the contract is cancelled and the earnest money should be
returned, \vhere is the remedy for the damages for lost use of real property, for dominion
and control over the appellant's property for nearly one year, for the expenses associated
with the property which Buku controlled and other items? Where is the remedy for the
expenses of moving to the townhome, the taxes, utilities, upkeep, and cost of such
purchase? This purchase (of the townhome) was authorized by the respondent.
The respondent should be estopped from asserting rights contrary to the
representations made to the appellants. Estoppel ties into the detrimental reliance theory.
Estoppel is defined as follows:
Equitable estoppel requires
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or
constmctive knowledge of the truth;
(2) that the party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the tmth;
(3) an intent that the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and
(4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment
to his or her prejudice.

Tndn Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,22,644 P.2d 341, 344
(1982).
E. Detrimental Reliance
Allowing promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration
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IS

permitted in those situations ,,,,here injustice would otherwise result. The
reason for the doctrine also defines its limits. In order to allege the defense of
promissory estoppel, it must be shown: (1) the detriment suffered in reliance
was substantial in an economic sense; (2) the substantial loss to the promisee
acting in reliance ,,,,as or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and
(3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the
promise as made. Simpson, Contracts § 42 (1954).
See also, Restatement of Contracts, § 90.
kIohr v. Shultz, 388 P.2d 1002, 86 Idaho 531, (Idaho 1964)
------------ Excerpt from pages 388 P.2d 1008-388 P.2d 1009.

The appellants, unquestionably, relied upon the assurances of the respondents.
These items of damage, mentioned above, are not controlled by an express contract.
Therefore, there was no adequate remedy at la,,,,. Judge Moeller, in the first ruling on
summary judgment recognized these facts. The lower court, on the second ruling, failed to
consider the reasoning of Judge Moeller in the first summary judgment memorandum
decision.
5.

THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON IDAHO CODE 9-503;

AND, EQUITABLE REMEDIES WHICH WERE DISMISSED SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN INCLUDED IN ANY SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION.
The appellants have never alleged that a new written agreement existed after the
closing date did not conclude this matter. The appellants do not dispute the clear written
language of paragraph 21 ofthe contracts in question. Nor do Clark and Peterson dispute
the statute of frauds language as contained in Idaho Code 9-503. The la,,,, is clear on those
points and it is believed that the respondent has "missed the point" of the court's earlier
ruling Uudge Moeller's first ruling].
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That court was stating that various facts exist to determine whether there is
justification for return of earnest money. If there are not sufficient facts to enable Buku
return of the earnest money, then the fact-finder needs to make such a determination. Both
pre- and post- contracts, Buku has led the appellants to believe the sale would occur and the
balance of money \vould be paid to Clark and Peterson.

It is very clear that part-performance creates various remedies under the Statute of
Frauds. The respondent began to perform on the promise to purchase. This case was not
about zoning. The case has never been about the inability of zoning, despite the assertions
of Buku, or any deficiency on the real properties; or, for that matter, the good faith and fair
dealings of Clark and Peterson.
Quite clearly, part performance is explained in more technical terms concerning the
Statute of Frauds as follows:
We turn to "part" performance. \Vhen we use this term, we mean
performance by either or both parties of less than all their respective
obligations under the contract. There is no literal foundation in I.e. § 9-505
for the oft-made assertion that part performance takes a contract outside the
statute. Plainly it does not. The contract is still within the statute. At least a
portion of the contract remains "to be performed" on both sides. Compare
I.e. § 9-504 (explicitly referring to part performance of land sale contracts
under I.e. § 9-503). Rather, it is more accurate to say that in some
circumstances, part performance may establish an equitable ground to avoid
the strictures of the statute of frauds.
In A11en v. lVloyle, 84 Idaho 18, 367 P.2d 579 (1961), discussing contracts for personal
services, our Supreme Court implicitly recognized this point:
[T]he equitable doctrine of part performance is not applicable to a contract ...
within the statute of frauds.... The mere part performance of such a contract
does not take it out of the operation of the statute or permit a recovery under
the contract for any part of the contract remaining executory .... [T]o hold that
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part performance is performance would be a nullification of the statute.
Id. at 23, 367 P.2d at 582 (quoting 49 AM.JUR. § 497, at 798). Similarly,
in International Business Machines Corp. v. Law11Orn, 106 Idaho 194, 198, 677
P.2d 507, 511 (Ct.App.1984), we referred to part performance as a doctrine
"grounded in equity." The doctrine of part performance is best understood
as a specific form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel.
Accordingly, we \vill return to it in the next section of this opinion.
Hovering uneasily benveen full performance by both parties and part
performance by either or both parties is a troublesome hybrid known as "full"
performance by one party. American courts and commentators have long
disagreed--\vith varying degrees of awareness and perception--as to whether
such performance is akin to full performance by both sides (taking a contract
outside the statute of frauds) or more closely resembles part performance
(possibly allowing equitable relief from the statute). A majority of courts
appear to hold the former vie\v. CALAMARI & PERILLO § 19-23; CORBIN
§ 457; L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 89
(2d ed. 1965) (hereinafter SIMPSON); 73 AM.JUR.2D Statute of Frauds § 533
(1974) (hereinafter Statute of Frauds). However, "no ... general principle can
be derived from the decisions on this point." WILLISTON § 528. Thus.
some COlirts have held that the statute of fi:auds does not avvlv to a contract
fuII.v executed on one side. where nothing remains to be done on the other
side except to pay mone"v. See SIMPSON § 89. Courts adopting this view
may order the contract to be enforced in damages. Other courts, taking an
approach analogous to part performance, may consider an equitable or quasicontractual remedy, such as quantum merit. Id.
::a.. . . . . .

Although the Idaho courts have not explicitly addressed this issue, our
cases strongly point to the equity approach. The Idaho Supreme Court
repeatedly has held that when one party has fully performed an oral contract
within the statute of frauds, he is not entitled to collect damages for a breach.
Rather, he is entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance. E.g.,
Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480 P.2d 896 (1971); Quayle v. Mackert, 92
Idaho 563, 447 P.2d 679 (1968).
These cases put Idaho among a minority of states, but rye think the
equity approach is sound. It offers greater consistency with the literal
language of Idaho's [111 Idaho 10101 statute of frauds. For even if one side
has fully performed a contract, the contract as a whole remains "to be
performed. " Moreover, it is the nonperforming party who seeks protection
under the statute. [In the instant case, the plaintiff, BukuJ. Conceptually, it
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makes little sense to allow the extent of the opposing party's performance to
determine whether the contract is within or without the statute. It makes
greater sense. in our view. to examine the conduct of both parties. and the
circumstances surrounding the alleged contract. to determine whether the
par{v invoking the statute of frauds is eqllitabl,v entitled to do so.
Accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of full performance by one party, like
the doctrine of part performance, does not take the contract out of the statute
of frauds. Rather, it should be treated as a form of equitable estoppeL
(Emphasis supplied).
Frantz v. Parke7 729 P.2d 1068, 111 Idaho 1005, (Idaho App. 1986)
------------ Excerpt from pages 729 P.2d 1072-729 P.2d 1073.

The doctrine of part performance ,vorks in conjunction with the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. "Under Idaho law, part performance per se does not
remove a contract from the operation of the statute of frauds. Rather, the
doctrine of part performance is best understood as a specific form of the more
general principle of equitable estoppel." Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367, 109 P.3d
at 1109. (citing Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492, 499 (2004)).
Equitable estoppel generally, and the doctrine of part performance
speciJicall,v. assume the existence of a complete agreement. See Lettunich,
141 Idaho at 367,109 P.3d at 1109.
The language quoted above from cases in Idaho is precisely what the district court in
its first ruling Uudge Moeller] ,vas referring to \vhen it stated: "the behavior of the parties"
and similar language as stated therein. This language is identical to the issues propounded
by the court cases as highlighted above.
Respondent cannot rely upon mere allegations of zoning issues to defeat the
contract. It has already been proven, through the Planning and Zoning Department, via
Naysha Foster, that the real property would not be re-zoned. 45 The contractual enforcement
rights exist for the benefit of the appellants.
aforementioned part performance theory.

45

R. pp. 144-153.
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The equitable remedies exist due to the

Those theories are contained in the counter-

claims of appellants.
Respondent misses the point of these facts \vhen arguing for its second summary
judgment motion.

These controverted facts show the surrounding nature of the

circumstances of how Buku dealt; and, that such dealings were not in good faith.

The

controverted facts still do not solve the unresolved question of \vhether Buku could
unilaterally terminate a contract, partially performed, by the assumption of zoning issues
which were non-existent. The clear testimony contained in the record is that the zoning
issue was a non-issue. Such fact has not been rebutted by Buku.
Summary judgment on the second motion was clearly inappropriate.
6.

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ITS AWARD OF FEES,

COSTS AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
The lower court issued a document entitled "JUDGMENT RE: MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT" dated February 3, 2011 ..f6 Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure require that a request for fees, costs and/or other requests must be submitted
within 14 days of a final judgment. 47 The respondent filed its Memorandum on February 22,
2011. Fourteen (14) days had expired prior to the filing.
However,

this

Supreme

Court

suspended

46

the

appeal

for

"D.C.

FINAL

R. pp. 392-394.
47
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party \",ho
claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs, itemizing each
claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be filed later than fourteen (14)
days after entry of judgment.
IRCP Rule 54, Judgments.
------------ Excerpt from page 169.
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JUDGMENT".

48

The appellant appealed from the "Judgment" entered by the district

court. The respondent failed to timely respond. This court then suspended the appeal and
may have caused to become "moot" the timing of the 14 day response.
This court held as follo'\vs:
Rule 58(a) requires that" [e]very judgment shall be set forth on a
separate document." That requirement was added to the Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1992. Hunting v. Clark County School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho
634,637,931 P.2d 628,631 (1997). "The purpose of this rule is to eliminate
confusion about when the clock for an appeal begins to run. The separate
document requirement was also designed to eliminate uncertainty over what
actions of the district court are intended to be its judgment." 46 Am.Jur.2d
Judgments § 70 (2006) (footnotes omitted).

Spokane Structures7 Inc. v. Equitable Inv' 7 LLC, 226 P.3d 1263, 148 Idaho 616,
(Idaho 2010)
------------ Excerpt from page 226 P.3d 1266.
The judgment entered by the court and contained in the record is clearly set forth in
a separate document and sets forth the time and date for the clock to begin running. As
such, appellants believed the same was a final judgment.

Respondent missed the time

period to request fees and costs. (See footnote 44).
However, other reasons exist for the denial of fees, costs and pre-judgment interest.
Most notable, the appellants believe they are correct upon this appeal and the matter will be
reversed.

Absent that argument, the appellants still believe they are correct as stated

hereafter.
Buku requested a rescission of the contracts with Clark and Peterson which
were for the sale of the real property. The lower court believed that Buku could rescind the
48

R. pp. 432-433.
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contract based upon a due diligence period contained in the contract nonvithstanding the
lack of evidence associated \vith any zoning issues on the real property. In any event, the
court granted summary judgment and the contract became a nullity. As such, there was no
contract.

Thus, no contractual basis exists for the a\vard of fees since there was "no

contract" according to the grant of summary judgment.
having dismissed the contract claims, the action could not have been
one" to recover on a contract." \Ve affirmed the action of the trial court in
Day, stating that "to recover attorney fees under the statute, the action must
be one to recover on the contract, not merely an action arising from a
transaction relating to the purchase or sale of goods." 115 Idaho at 1018, 772
P.2d at 225. Based upon the interpretation of the statute in Day, the trial
court's grant of attorney fees against appellants must be reversed; there being
no contract between appellants
Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac~
(Idaho 1991)
------------ Excerpt from page 809 P.2d 491.

Inc.~

809 P.2d 487, 119 Idaho 626,

The same logic holds true for the claim of a commercial transaction under Idaho
Code Section 12-120. If there is "no transaction" between the parties because the parties are
returned to the status quo, then there is no basis for the award of fees. If the "Agreement"
is rescinded, then no transaction occurred. Thus, no basis exists statutorily for the award of
fees.
"there is a clear distinction between litigation arising from a
commercial transaction and litigation on noncommercial issues that might
have future commercial ramifications." 117 Idaho at 424, 788 P.2d at 239. For
reasons different from those given by the district judge, \ve conclude that an
award of attorney fees in this case was not authorized under I.e. § 12-120(3).
Edwards v. Edrvards, 842 P.2d 307,122 Idaho 971, (Idaho App. 1992)
------------ Excerpt from page 842 P.2d 309.
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This action before the court involved the future purchase of the real property.
Although the appellants' disagree \vith the court's ruling on summary judgment, the case as
it stands rescinded the contract and made the future purchase of the real property
problematic.

Future commercial ramifications do not come under the definition of

commercial transactions to be able to award fees and costs.
The lack of a contract or a statutory basis prohibits the award of fees and costs.
With respect to the provision allowing attorney fees in a commercial
transaction, the statute defines a commercial transaction as all transactions
except transactions for personal and household purposes. This Court has
held that the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the
gravamen of the lawsuit. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714
(1995); Bro~ver v. [126 Idaho 900] E.L DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117
Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990). The gravamen of the lawsuit refers to whether
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis
upon which the party is attempting to recover. Brower, 117 Idaho at 784, 792
P.2d at 349.

Property Management U7est~ Inc. v. Hllnt~ 894 P.2d 130, 126 Idaho 897, (Idaho 1995)
------------ Excerpt from pages 894 P.2d 132-894 P.2d 133.
The claim for reimbursement by Buku was by rescinding the contract. By rescinding
the contract to recover the earnest money, no contract existed and could not be, by the
court's ruling, the gravamen of the lawsuit since a contract no longer existed and a
commercial transaction no longer existed. Thus, fees cannot be awarded.
No argument, of a reasonable nature, is made for fees pursuant to any other statute
including Idaho Code 12-121. If so, the court should be convinced that nothing done by the
appellants was unreasonable, frivolous or without foundation.
Assuming

arguendo
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determines

fees

should

be

awarded,

reasonableness of fees is governed by Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The
plaintiff should not be entitled to fees leading up to the ruling on summary judgment by this
court.
The appellants successfully defended the first summary judgment motion and all
allegations until the second sitting judge made a ruling. Thus, all fees prior to the briefing
on the latest summary judgment motion (second motion for summary judgment) should be
denied.
The appellants prevailed on the first motion and the events leading up to that
decision. Thus, the respondents could not argue, in reasonable fashion, that it was entitled
to fees until the date of July 8, 2010. (The date commencing the preparation for the second
summary judgment motion.) Furthermore, the court did not accept the motions to strike,
etc. and those matters should not be awarded for the unsuccessful attempt by Buku. Buku
"vould only be entitled to 68.9 hours according to the affidavit of its attorney commencing
July 8, 2010 until February 15, 2011.
Fees and costs should not be awarded. However, if the contract is reinstated and the
matter set for trial, all parties would then be subject to the contractual terms and the jury
determina tion.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

THE APPELLANTS REQUESTS THEIR COSTS AND FEES AT HEARINGS IN

THE LOWER COURT
Justice Jesse R. Walters, Jr. in his updated primer of the former Lon Davis manual on
the a\vard of attorney fees, A Primer For Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, Idaho Law
Review, Volume 38, 2001, Number 1, indicates that the following steps are necessary for an
award of fees and costs:
A. A prevailing party;
B. A statutory or contract basis for award of fees; and,

C. Compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
The respondents were not entitled to summary judgment and could not be a
prevailing party.

Second, the appellants were entitled to a ruling on their summary

judgment motion that respondent breached the contracts.

The appellants would have

prevailed.
Both judges accepted and considered evidence outside the four corners of the
contracts despite a ruling such contracts and clauses contained in the contracts were
unambiguous. The law does not allow such action. Clark v. St. Paul Property and Liability
Ins.

Companies~

639 P.2d 454,102 Idaho 756, (Idaho 1981).

Moreover, the documents were drafted by respondents and should have been
construed against Buku. Additionally, the court must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to Clark and Peterson. Smith v. Idaho State Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d
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1016 (Ct. App. 1982); Banner Life Ins. Co. v. fr"lark Wallace DiYson Irrevocable Tnlst, 147
Idaho 117, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). The court also was precluded from dra"\ving inferences in
favor of the respondents since the court was not the fact-finder as this matter was scheduled
for a jury trial. Sewell v. Neilson, lv[onroe, Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 706 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1985);
Farnworth v Ratliff, 134 Idaho 337, 999 P.2d 892 (2000).
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2.

THE APPELLANTS REQUEST THEIR COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL.
An award of attorney fees on appeal requires a statutory or contractual basis. A

contract exists in the case at bar \vith an attorney fee provision if this court reinstates the
contract and remands the matter for trial. Appellants rely upon the contract and upon Idaho
Code §§ 12-120; 12-121 and I.A.R., Rules 40 and 41 in their request for fees on appeal.
Fees are awarded on appeal as follows:
Section 12-120(3) of the Idaho Code requires that the court hearing any
action arising out of a contract for services award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party. This Court has interpreted I.e. § 12-120(3) to mandate
the award of attorney fees on appeal as well as at trial. Chemetics, 130 Idaho
at 258,939 P.2d at 577 .
. . . also asserts a right to attorney fees and costs on appeal based on
I.A.R. 40, I.A.R. 41, I.e. § 12-120 and I.e. § 12-121. As stated above, this Court
has held that I.e. § 12-120(3) mandates the award of attorney fees on appeal to
the prevailing party. Additionally, costs are properly awarded to the
prevailing party on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc.,
130 Idaho 342, 353, 941 P.2d 314, 325 (1997).
Hummer v. Evans~ 979 P.2d 1188, 132 Idaho 830, (Idaho 1999)
------------ Excerpt from page 979 P.2d 1191.
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Fees should be awarded to appellant as a prevailing party pursuant to the contract,
statutes cited, and Rule 54, LR.C.P. The lower court could not have made the findings and
conclusions to support summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The lower court could not supplement an "unambiguous" clause or contract with
additional evidence not contained in the contracts. The intent of the parties is a factual
question to be determined by the fact-finder. Respondent breached the contracts with the
appellants. Fees and costs were not proper or properly considered. Pre-judgment interest
\vas inappropriate.
Fees and costs should be awarded to the appellants at trial and upon appeal.
DATED this 7th day of November, 2011.

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7th day of November, 2011 true and correct copies
of the foregoing were delivered to the following persons(s) by:
Hand Delivery
xx

Postage-prepaid mail
Facsimile Transmission

Robin D. Dunn, Esq.
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

DeAnne Casperson, Esq.
Attorney for Respondents
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
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